Positive Logic with Adjoint Modalities: Proof Theory, Semantics and Reasoning about Information  by Sadrzadeh, Mehrnoosh & Dyckhoff, Roy
Positive Logic with Adjoint Modalities:
Proof Theory, Semantics and Reasoning about
Information
Mehrnoosh Sadrzadeh 1,2
Computer Laboratory,
Oxford University,
Oxford, England, UK
Roy Dyckhoﬀ 3
School of Computer Science,
St Andrews University,
St Andrews, Scotland, UK
Abstract
We consider a simple modal logic whose non-modal part has conjunction and disjunction as connectives and
whose modalities come in adjoint pairs, but are not in general closure operators. Despite absence of negation
and implication, and of axioms corresponding to the characteristic axioms of (e.g.) T, S4 and S5, such logics
are useful, as shown in previous work by Baltag, Coecke and the ﬁrst author, for encoding and reasoning
about information and misinformation in multi-agent systems. For such a logic we present an algebraic
semantics, using lattices with agent-indexed families of adjoint pairs of operators, and a cut-free sequent
calculus. The calculus exploits operators on sequents, in the style of “nested” or “tree-sequent” calculi;
cut-admissibility is shown by constructive syntactic methods. The applicability of the logic is illustrated by
reasoning about the muddy children puzzle, for which the calculus is augmented with extra rules to express
the facts of the muddy children scenario.
Keywords: positive modal logic, epistemic, doxastic, distributive lattice, Galois connection, adjunction,
information, belief, proof theory
1 Introduction
Modal logics include various modalities, represented as unary operators, used to
formalize and reason about extra modes such as time, provability, belief and knowl-
edge, applicable in various areas (we have that of security protocols in mind). Like
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disjunction and conjunction, modalities often come in pairs, e.g.  and : one
preserves disjunctions and the other conjunctions. According to the intended ap-
plication, further axioms such as monotonicity and idempotence can be imposed on
the modalities.
As well as relational (or Kripke) models, one may consider as models for such
logics various ordered structures, such as lattices with operators. The question then
arises as to what is the simplest way of obtaining a pair of these operators. If the
lattice is a Boolean Algebra and thus has negation, any join-preserving operator
(such as ) immediately provides us with a meet-preserving one (such as ) by de
Morgan duality. In a Heyting Algebra, the lack of De Morgan duality will cause
one of these operators to preserve meets only in one direction. What if no negation
is present, e.g. in a distributive lattice? The categorical notion of adjunction (aka
Galois connection) is useful here: any (arbitrary) join-preserving endomorphism on
a lattice has a Galois right adjoint, which (by construction) preserves meets. For
example, in category Sup of sup-lattices with join-preserving maps, every such map
is residuated, i.e. has a right adjoint.
In this paper, we consider a minimal modal logic where the underlying logic has
only two binary non-modal connectives—conjunction and disjunction—and where
the modalities are adjoint but have no closure-type properties (such as idempo-
tence). As algebraic semantics one may consider a bounded distributed lattice, the
modalities thereof being residuated lattice endomorphisms. Examples are residu-
ated distributive lattice monoids and Heyting algebras when one argument of their
residuated multiplication and conjunction (respectively) is ﬁxed. One may also con-
sider a relational semantics. In the proof of relational completeness, the absence
of negation prohibits us from following standard canonical model constructions, as
we can no more form maximally consistent sets. We overcome this by developing
an equivalent Hilbert-style axiomatization for our logic and then using the general
Sahlqvist results of [10] based on completion of algebras with operators.
We provide a sequent calculus, which contains, in addition to axioms for the
logical constants ,⊥ only the operational left and right rules for each connective
and operator. We prove admissibility of the structural rules of Contraction, Weak-
ening and Cut by constructive syntactic methods. In the absence of negation and of
closure-type properties for the modalities, developing well-behaved sequent calculus
rules for the modalities (in particular the left rule for the right adjoint ) was a
challenging task; a calculus not obviously allowing cut-elimination was given in [1].
Our sequents are a generalization of Gentzen’s where the contexts (antecedents of
sequents), as well as formulae, have a structure and can be nested. For applica-
tion, we augment our calculus with a rule that allows us to encode assumptions of
epistemic scenarios, and show that Cut is still admissible.
We interpret our adjoint modalities as information and uncertainty and use
them to encode and prove epistemic properties of the puzzle of muddy children.
Due to the absence of negation, we can only express and prove positive versions
of these epistemic properties. But, our proofs are simpler than the proofs of tra-
ditional modal logics, e.g. those in [12]. In a nutshell, in just one proof step the
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adjunction is unfolded and the information modality is replaced by the uncertainty
modality; in the next proof step, the assumptions of the scenario are imported into
the logic via the assumption rule. At this stage the modalities are eliminated and
the proof continues in a propositional setting. Since our information modality is
not necessarily truthful, we are able to reason about more challenging versions of
epistemic scenarios, for example when agents are dishonest and their deceitful com-
munications lead to false information. Properties of these more challenging versions
have not been proved in traditional modal logic in computer science approaches,
like that of [12].
From a proof theoretic point of view, it is the ﬁrst time that a cut-free sequent
calculus has been developed for logics where the underlying propositional logic has
no negation and implication and where the modalities are adjoint. There is a gap in
the literature on proof theory for modal logic for the combination of the two. The
calculi speciﬁcally designed to deal with adjoint connectives, such as the display
calculi [4,11,16] need to have at least one adjoint binary operator and face a challenge
in developing cut-free rules for our positive non-adjoint connectives. Perhaps the
closest to our proof systems are deep inference systems; but the modal deep inference
systems developed so far, e.g. by Brunnler [6] and Kashima [14] include negation
and implication. Of these two formalisms, the closest to ours is that for the tense
logic of Kashima. Other than diﬀerences in logic (presence of negation and two-
sided sequents), which lead to diﬀerent modal rules (based on de Morgan duality),
our proof theoretic techniques have a merit over those of Kashima: (1) we formalize
deep substitution in the nested sequents and as a result do not need to develop two
diﬀerent versions of the calculus and prove soundness and completeness separately,
and (2) our cut-admissibility proofs are done explicitly via a syntactic construction
rather than as a consequence of semantic completeness.
Some proof systems encode modalities by introducing semantic labels to encode
accessibility and satisfaction relations; these are better placed to produce cut-free
systems for adjoint modalities, e.g. the comprehensive work of Negri [17] and [24]
for classical and intuitionistic modal logics. The former in particular can be adapted
to provide a cut-free labelled sequent calculus for our logic. However, that these
systems are strongly based on the relational semantics of modal logic and mix it with
the syntax of the logic does not ﬁt well with the spirit of the algebraic motivation
behind our minimal logic.
On the application side, adjoint modalities have been originally used to reason
about time in the context of tense logics, e.g. in [19,13]. Their epistemic application
is novel and was initiated in the dynamic epistemic algebra of [1,23], constituting
a pair of an endowed quantale of “actions” and its right module of “propositions”
and abstracting over the Dynamic Epistemic Logic of [2]. Our work provides an
answer to two open problems in that work: (1) elimination of the cut rule for [a
variant of] the calculus corresponding to the propositional part of the algebra, and
(2) complete relational models and representation theorems for the propositional
part.
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2 Sequent calculus for positive logic with adjoint
modalities
2.1 Sequent Calculus
We refer to our logic as APML for “adjoint positive modal logic”, with the suﬃx
Tree when we consider a tree-style sequent calculus. The set M of formulae m
of our logic is generated over a set A of agents A and a set At of atoms p by the
following grammar:
m ::= ⊥ |  | p | m ∧m | m ∨m | A m | A(m)
Items I and contexts Γ are generated by the following syntax:
I ::= m | ΓA Γ ::= I multiset
where ΓA will be interpreted as A(
∧
Γ), for
∧
Γ the conjunction of the interpre-
tations of elements in Γ.
Thus, contexts are ﬁnite multi-sets of items, whereas items are either formulae
or agent-annotated contexts. The use of multi-sets rather than sets makes the role
of the Contraction rule explicit, with the rules in a form close to the requirements
of an implementation. The union of two multi-sets is indicated by a comma, as in
Γ,Γ′ or (treating an item I as a one element multiset) as in Γ, I.
If one of the items inside a context is replaced by a “hole” [], we have a context-
with-a-hole. More precisely, we have the notions of context-with-a-hole Δ and item-
with-a-hole J , deﬁned using mutual recursion as follows:
Δ ::= Γ, J J ::= [] | ΔA
and so a context-with-a-hole is a context (i.e. a multiset of items) together with an
item-with-a-hole, i.e. either a hole or an agent-annotated context-with-a-hole. To
emphasise that a context-with-a-hole is not a context, we use Δ for the former and
Γ for the latter; similarly for items-with-a-hole J and items I.
Given a context-with-a-hole Δ and a context Γ, the result Δ[Γ] of applying
the ﬁrst to the second, i.e. replacing the hole [] in Δ by Γ, is a context, deﬁned
recursively (together with the application of an item-with-a-hole to a context) as
follows:
(Γ′, J)[Γ] = Γ′, J [Γ] ([])[Γ] = Γ (ΔA)[Γ] = Δ[Γ]A
Given contexts-with-a-hole Δ′,Δ, and an item-with-a-hole J , the combinations
Δ′ •Δ and J •Δ are deﬁned as follows by mutual recursion on the structures of Δ′
and J :
(Γ, J) •Δ = Γ, (J •Δ) ([]) •Δ = Δ (Δ′′A) •Δ = (Δ′′ •Δ)A
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Lemma 2.1 Given contexts-with-a-hole Δ′,Δ, an item-with-a-hole J and a context
Γ, the following hold:
(Δ′ •Δ)[Γ] = Δ′[Δ[Γ]] (J •Δ)[Γ] = J [Δ[Γ]]
Proof. Routine. 
We have the following initial sequents (in which p is restricted to being an atom):
Γ, p  p Id Δ[⊥]  m ⊥L Γ   R
The rules for the lattice operations and the modal operators are:
Δ[m1,m2]  m
Δ[m1 ∧m2]  m ∧L
Γ  m1 Γ  m2
Γ  m1 ∧m2 ∧R
Δ[m1]  m Δ[m2]  m
Δ[m1 ∨m2]  m ∨L
Γ  m1
Γ  m1 ∨m2 ∨R1
Γ  m2
Γ  m1 ∨m2 ∨R2
Δ[mA]  m′
Δ[A(m)]  m′ AL
Γ  m
Γ′,ΓA  A(m)
AR
Δ[(Am,Γ)A,m]  m′
Δ[(Am,Γ)A]  m′
AL Γ
A  m
Γ  A m AR
The two indicated occurrences of p in the Id rule are principal. Each right rule
has its conclusion’s succedent as its principal formula; in addition, the AR rule has
ΓA as a principal item and Γ′ (which is there to ensure admissibility of Weakening)
as its parameter. Each left rule has a principal item; these are as usual, except
that the AL rule has the formula Am principal as well as the principal item
(Am,Γ)A.
Note that the AL rule duplicates the principal item in the conclusion into the
premiss; in examples, we may omit this duplicated item for simplicity. This dupli-
cation allows a proof of the admissibility of Contraction, and thus of completeness.
To see its necessity, note that the following sequent is (according to the algebraic
semantics in Section 3) valid:
A(A(m ∨ n)) ≤ (m ∧ A(A(m ∨ n))) ∨ (n ∧ A(A(m ∨ n)))
It is, however, not derivable unless the principal item of AL is duplicated into the
rule’s premiss.
As a standard check on the rules, we show the following:
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Lemma 2.2 For every formula m and every context Γ, the sequent Γ,m  m is
derivable.
Proof. By induction on the size of m. In case m is an atom, or ⊥, or , the sequent
Γ,m  m is already initial. For compound m, consider the cases. Meet and join
are routine. Suppose m is A(m′); by inductive hypothesis, we can derive m′  m′,
and by AR we can derive Γ,m′A  A(m′), whence Γ,A(m′)  A(m′) by AL.
Now suppose m is Am′. By inductive hypothesis, we can derive
(Γ,Am′)A,m′  m′, and by AL we get (Γ,Am′)A  m′; from this we obtain
Γ,m  m by AR. 
Since we use multisets (for contexts) rather than sets or lists, the rules of ex-
change and associativity are inexpressible.
To allow induction on the sizes of items, we need a precise deﬁnition, with a
similar deﬁnition for contexts. The size of a formula is just the (weighted) number
of operator occurrences, counting each operator A and A as having weight 2;
the size of an item ΓA is the size of Γ plus 1, and the size of a context is the sum
of the sizes of its items. The size of a sequent Γ  m is just the sum of the sizes
of Γ and m. Note that each premiss of a rule instance has lower size than the
conclusion, except for the rule AL, whose presence leads to non-termination of a
naive implementation of the calculus.
Lemma 2.3 The following Weakening rule is admissible:
Δ[Γ]  m
Δ[Γ,Γ′]  m Wk
Proof. Induction on the depth of the derivation of the premiss and case analysis
(on the rule used in the last step). Suppose the last step is by AR, with m = Am′,
and with premiss Γ∗  m′ and conclusion Γ′′,Γ∗A  m, so Δ[Γ] = Γ′′,Γ∗A. To obtain
Δ[Γ,Γ′] from this there are two possibilities. In the ﬁrst case, Γ occurs inside Γ∗A,
and we make a routine use of the inductive hypothesis and reapply AR with the
same parameter. In the second case, we just use the AR rule with a diﬀerent
parameter. Other cases are straightforward. 
Lemma 2.4 The AL and AR rules are invertible, i.e. the following are admis-
sible:
Δ[A(m)]  m′
Δ[mA]  m′ AInv
Γ  Am
ΓA  m AInv
Proof. Induction on the height of the derivation of the premiss. 
Lemma 2.5 The ∧L, ∨L and ∧R rules are invertible.
Proof. Induction on the height of the derivation of the premiss. 
Lemma 2.6 The following Item Contraction rule is admissible
Δ[I, I]  m
Δ[I]  m IContr
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Proof. Strong induction on the size of the item I, with a subsidiary induction on
the height of the derivation of the premiss, together with case analysis and the above
inversion lemmas. Consider the cases of the last step; ﬁrst, when I is non-principal,
we permute the contraction up and (keeping I ﬁxed) apply the subsidiary induction
hypothesis; when the premiss is an initial sequent, so is the conclusion; when the
step is by AR with I principal (and thus of the form Γ′A) the premiss of that
step has antecedent Γ′ from which the copy of I is absent, allowing reuse of the
AR rule to yield Δ[I]  m; and, when I is otherwise principal, the last step is
one of the four one-premiss left rules. The AL case is handled by the subsidiary
inductive hypothesis (for the two cases, where I is an item (Am′,Γ)A and where
it is a formula Am′ inside such an item), and the other cases (∧L,∨L,AL) are
handled by the invertibility lemmas and the main inductive hypothesis. 
Corollary 2.7 The following Contraction rule is admissible
Δ[Γ,Γ]  m
Δ[Γ]  m Contr
Proof. Induction on the size of the context Γ, by Lemma 2.6. 

Lemma 2.8 The rule L− is admissible:
Δ[]  m
Δ[Γ]  m L
−
Proof. Induction on the depth of the derivation of the premiss and case analysis.

Theorem 2.9 The Cut rule is admissible
Γ  m Δ′[m]  m′
Δ′[Γ]  m′ Cut
Proof. Strong induction on the rank of the cut, where the rank is given by the
pair: (size of cut formula m, sum of heights of derivations of premisses).
We give two of the reductions to illustrate the argument; all the cases are con-
sidered in the full version [22] of the paper. Note the use of AInv in the ﬁrst. The
second is one of many cases where the ﬁrst premiss is an instance of AR.
(i) The ﬁrst premiss is an instance of AR.
Γ  m
Γ′,ΓA  A(m)
AR
Δ′[A(m)]  m′
Δ′[Γ′,ΓA]  m′ Cut
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is transformed to
Γ  m
Δ′[A(m)]  m′
Δ′[mA]  m′ AInv
Δ′[ΓA]  m′ Cut
Δ′[Γ′,ΓA]  m′ Wk
(ii) The ﬁrst premiss is an instance of AR and the second an instance of AL,
principal
ΓA  m
Γ  Am AR
Δ′[(Am,Γ′)A,m]  m′
Δ′[(Am,Γ′)A]  m′
AL
Δ′[(Γ,Γ′)A]  m′ Cut
transforms to
ΓA  m
Γ  Am Δ′[(Am,Γ′)A,m]  m′
Δ′[(Γ,Γ′)A,m]  m′ Cut
Δ′[(Γ,Γ′)A,ΓA]  m′ Cut
Δ′[(Γ,Γ′)A, (Γ,Γ′)A]  m′ Wk
Δ′[(Γ,Γ′)A]  m Contr

Proposition 2.10 The following rule (the name K is roughly from [16]) is admis-
sible:
Δ[ΓA,Γ′A, (Γ,Γ′)A]  m
Δ[(Γ,Γ′)A]  m K
Proof. In the simplest case, Γ and Γ′ are just multi-sets of formulae. Let γ =
∧
Γ
and γ′ =
∧
Γ′. The proof uses Cut and is as follows, where a superﬁx ∗ indicates
several instances of a rule:
. . .
Γ,Γ′  γ ∧R
∗ . . .
Γ,Γ′  γ′ ∧R
∗ Δ[Γ
A,Γ′A, (Γ,Γ′)A]  m
Δ[(γ)A, (γ′)A, (Γ,Γ′)A]  m ∧L
∗
Δ[(Γ,Γ′)A, (Γ,Γ′)A, (Γ,Γ′)A]  m Cut
∗
Δ[(Γ,Γ′)A]  m Contr
∗

The more general case can be handled using a syntactic analog of the interpre-
tation function given in the next section, and suitable generalisations of the ∧R∗
and ∧L∗ steps used above.
3 Semantics
3.1 Algebraic Semantics
Deﬁnition 3.1 Let A be a set, with elements called agents. A DLAM over A is a
bounded distributive lattice (L,,⊥) with twoA-indexed families {A}A∈A : L → L
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and {A}A∈A : L → L of order-preserving maps, with each A left adjoint to A.
Thus, the following hold, for all l, l′ ∈ L:
l ≤ l′ impliesA(l) ≤ A(l′) (1)
l ≤ l′ impliesA(l) ≤ A(l′) (2)
A(l) ≤ l′ iﬀ l ≤ A(l′) (3)
Proposition 3.2 In any DLAM the following hold, for all l, l′ ∈ L:
A(l ∨ l′) = A(l) ∨ A(l′) (4)
A(l ∧ l′) = A(l) ∧A(l′) (5)
A(l ∧ l′) ≤ A(l) ∧ A(l′) (6)
A(l) ∨A(l′) ≤ A(l ∨ l′) (7)
A(⊥) = ⊥ A() =  (8)
A(A(l)) ≤ l (9)
l ≤ A(A(l)) (10)
Proof. (4) follows from (1) and (3); similarly (5) follows from (2) and (3). (6)
follows routinely from (1); similarly (7) follows from (1). (8) is routine, using (3),
⊥ ≤ A(⊥) and A() ≤ . (9) follows from (3) and A(l) ≤ A(l); (10) is
similar. 
Let L be a DLAM. An interpretation of the set M of formulae in L is a map
[[−]] : At → L. The meaning of formulae is obtained by induction on the structure
of the formulae:
[[m1 ∨m2]] = [[m1]] ∨ [[m2]], [[m1 ∧m2]] = [[m1]] ∧ [[m2]],
[[A(m)]] = A([[m]]), [[Am]] = A[[m]],
[[]] = , [[⊥]] = ⊥ .
The meanings of items and of contexts are obtained by mutual induction on their
structure:
[[m]] = as above
[[ΓA]] =A([[Γ]])
[[I1, · · · , In]] = [[I1]] ∧ · · · ∧ [[In]]
[[∅]] =
Note that, since ∧ is commutative and associative, the meaning of a context Γ
is independent of its presentation as a list of items in a particular order.
A sequent Γ  m is true in an interpretation [[−]] in L iﬀ [[Γ]] ≤ [[m]]; it is true in
L iﬀ true in all interpretations in L, and it is valid iﬀ true in every DLAM.
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Lemma 3.3 Let Γ,Γ′ be contexts with [[Γ]] ≤ [[Γ′]] and Δ a context-with-a-hole.
Then
[[Δ[Γ]]] ≤ [[Δ[Γ′]]].
Proof. Routine induction on the structure of Δ (using also a similar result for
items-with-a-hole). 
Theorem 3.4 (Soundness) Any derivable sequent is valid, i.e. Γ  m implies
[[Γ]] ≤ [[m]] is true in any interpretation [[−]] in any DLAM.
Proof. We show that the axioms of the sequent calculus are valid and that the
rules are truth-preserving.
• Axioms. These are routine.
• The right rules.
· ∧R and ∨R are routine.
· AR. We have to show
[[Γ]] ≤ [[m]] implies [[Γ′,ΓA]] ≤ [[A(m)]]
Assuming [[Γ]] ≤ [[m]], by deﬁnition of [[−]] we have to show [[Γ′]] ∧ A([[Γ]]) ≤
A([[m]]), which follows by monotonicity of A and deﬁnition of meet.
· AR. We have to show
[[ΓA]] ≤ [[m]] implies [[Γ]] ≤ [[Am]]
This follows directly from the deﬁnition of [[−]] and property (1) in the deﬁnition
of a DLAM as follows
A([[Γ]]) ≤ [[m]] iﬀ [[Γ]] ≤ A[[m]]
• The left rules. These are done by induction on the structure of Δ
· ∧L and ∨L are routine.
· AL, we have to show
[[Δ[mA]]] ≤ [[m′]] implies [[Δ[A(m)]]] ≤ [[m′]]
which easily follows from the deﬁnition of [[ ]].
· AL, we have to show
[[Δ[(Am,Γ)A,m]]] ≤ [[m′]] implies [[Δ[(Am,Γ)A]]] ≤ [[m′]]
for which it is enough to show
[[Δ[(Am,Γ)A]]] ≤ [[Δ[(Am,Γ)A,m]]]
By deﬁnition of contexts (and items) with holes this breaks down to three cases
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(i) [[(Am,Γ)A]] ≤ [[(Am,Γ)A,m]] which by deﬁnition of [[ ]] is equivalent to the
following
A(A[[m]] ∧ [[Γ]]) ≤ A(A[[m]] ∧ [[Γ]]) ∧m
and follows since by proposition 3.2 and deﬁnitions of A and ∧ we have
A(A[[m]] ∧ [[Γ]]) ≤ A(A[[m]]) ∧ A([[Γ]]) ≤ A(A[[m]]) ≤ m
(ii) [[Γ′, J [(Am,Γ)A]]] ≤ [[Γ′, J [(Am,Γ)A,m]]] follows from case 1 by recursively
unfolding the deﬁnition of an item-with-a-hole.
(iii) [[Δ′[(Am,Γ)A]B]] ≤ [[Δ′[(Am,Γ)A,m]B]] follows from case 1 by recursively
unfolding the deﬁnitions of a context-with-a-hole and an item-with-a-hole.

Theorem 3.5 Completeness. Any valid sequent is derivable, i.e. if [[Γ]] ≤ [[m]]
for every DLAM and every interpretation [[−]] therein, then Γ  m.
Proof. We follow the Lindenbaum-Tarski proof method of completeness (building
the counter-model) and show the following
(i) The logical equivalence ∼= deﬁned as  over the formulae in M is an equiva-
lence relation, i.e. it is reﬂexive, transitive (by the admissibility of Cut), and
symmetric.
(ii) The order relation ≤ deﬁned as  on the above equivalence classes is a partial
order, i.e. reﬂexive, transitive and anti-symmetric.
(iii) The operations ∧,∨,A, and A on the above equivalence classes (deﬁned in
a routine fashion) are well-deﬁned. To avoid confusion with the brackets of
the sequents, i.e. Δ[Γ′], we occasionally drop the brackets of the equivalence
classes and for example write A(m) for [A(m)].
(a) For A[m] := [A(m)] we show
[m] ∼= [m′] =⇒ [A(m)] ∼= [A(m′)]
The proof tree of one direction is as follows, the other direction is identically
easy
m  m′
mA  A(m′)
AR
A(m)  A(m′) AL
(b) For A[m] := [Am] we show
[m] ∼= [m′] =⇒ [Am] ∼= [Am′]
The proof tree of one direction is as follows, the other direction is identically
easy
m  m′
(Am)A  m′
AL
Am  Am′ AR
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(c) Similarly for [m1] ∧ [m2] := [m1 ∧m2] and [m1] ∨ [m2] := [m1 ∨m2].
(iv) The above operations satisfy the properties of a distributive adjoint lattice (i.e.
with binary joins and meets).
(a) The proof tree for one direction of join preservation of A is as follows, the
other direction is also easy.
m1  m1 Id
mA1  A(m1)
AR
mA1  A(m1) ∨ A(m2)
∨R1
m2  m2 Id
mA2  A(m2)
AR
mA2  A(m1) ∨ A(m2)
∨R2
(m1 ∨m2)A  A(m1) ∨ A(m2) ∨L
A(m1 ∨m2)  A(m1) ∨ A(m2) AL
(b) The proof trees for the adjunction between A and A are as follows
m  Am′
mA  m′ AInv
A(m)  m′ AL
A(m)  m′
mA  m′ AInv
m  Am′ AR

3.2 Examples of Algebraic Semantics
We point out some examples for the algebraic semantics of our calculus.
Example 3.6 The simplest example of a DLAM is a Heyting Algebra:
Proposition 3.7 A Heyting Algebra H is a DLAM over an arbitrary set A.
To see this let A(−) be h∧− for some h ∈ H, then, since ∧ is residuated, the
Galois right adjoint to A exists and is obtained from the implication. For instance
we can set
• A(−) =  ∧− and we obtain A = A = id,
• A(−) = ⊥ ∧− = ⊥ and we obtain A = ,
• H = A and we obtain A(−) = A ∧ −, hence A− = A ⊃ − where ⊃ is the
implication.
Example 3.8 One can argue that in a Heyting Algebra meets are commutative and
idempotent but our As generally are not. So a closer match would be a residuated
distributive lattice monoid:
Proposition 3.9 A residuated distributive lattice monoid Q is a DLAM over an ar-
bitrary set A.
Recall that a residuated distributive lattice monoid Q is a bounded distribu-
tive lattice (Q,∨,∧,,⊥) with a monoid structure (Q, •, 1) such that the monoid
multiplication preserves the joins and has a right adjoint in each argument, i.e.
q • −  −/q and − • q  q \ −. Thus if we take A(−) to be either q • − or − • q
then it will have a right adjoint in each case. For instance, we can set
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• A(−) = 1 • − or − • 1 and obtain A = A = id,
• or set A(−) = ⊥ •− or − •⊥ and obtain a A which is a bi-negation operator,
i.e. ¬l− = −/⊥ and ¬r− = ⊥ \ − respectively for each argument.
• Alternatively, we can have L = A and thus obtain A(−) = A • −, hence
A− = −/A, and similarly for the other argument.
3.3 Relational Semantics
In this section, we develop a Hilbert-style logic APMLHilb for our previous syntax
and show that this logic provides an axiomatization for APMLTree. We show that
this logic is sound and complete with regard to ordered Kripke Frames, by applying
the general Salqhvist theorem for distributive modal logics, developed by Gehrke et
al in [10].
The set of formulae M is the same as that of APMLTree. Since the language
does not include implication, following Dunn [9], the sequents are of the form m  m′
for m,m′ ∈ M . The axioms and rules are:
Axioms.
m  m, ⊥  m, m  
m ∧ (m′ ∨m′′)  (m ∧m′) ∨ (m ∧m′′)
m  m ∨m′, m′  m ∨m′, m ∧m′  m, m ∧m′  m′
A(m ∨m′)  A(m) ∨ A(m′), A(⊥)  ⊥
Am ∧Am′  A(m ∧m′),   A
A(Am)  m, m  AA(m)
Rules.
m  m′ m′  m′′
m  m′′ cut
m  m′′ m′  m′′
m ∨m′  m′′ ∨
m  m′ m  m′′
m  m′ ∧m′′ ∧
m  m′
A(m)  A(m′) A
m  m′
Am  Am′
A
Proposition 3.10 APMLHilb is sound and complete with respect to DLAMs.
Proof. Soundness is easy. Completeness follows from a routine Lindenbaum-Tarski
construction. 
Proposition 3.11 A sequent of the form m  m′ is derivable in APMLTree if and
only if it is derivable in APMLHilb.
Proof. Follows from proposition 3.10. 
A Hilbert-style modal logic is Sahlqvist whenever its modal axioms correspond
to ﬁrst order conditions of a Kripke frame. According to Sahlqvist’s Theorem, these
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modal logics are sound and complete with regard to their corresponding canonical
Kripke models [3].
Proposition 3.12 APMLHilb is Sahlqvist.
Proof. It suﬃces to show that the two axioms m  AA(m) and A(Am)  m
are Sahlqvist. According to the method developed in [10], the former sequent is
Sahlqvist if and only if m is left Sahlqvist and AA(m) is right Sahlqvist. The
former is obvious, the negative generation tree of the latter is as follows
−  (A,−)  (A,−)  (m,−)
This is right Sahlqvist since the only choice node A does not occurs in the scope of
the only universal node A. The proof of A(Am)  m being Sahlqvist is similar.

For a Kripke semantics, we consider a simpliﬁcation of that in [10]:
Deﬁnition 3.13 A multi-modal Kripke frame for APMLHilb is a tuple (W,≤
, {RA}A, {R−1A }A∈A), where W is a set of worlds, each RA is a binary relation
on W and R−1A is its converse, and ≤ is a partial order on W satisfying
≤ ◦R−1A ◦ ≤ ⊆ R−1A and ≥ ◦RA◦ ≥ ⊆ RA
A Kripke structure for APMLHilb is a pair M = (F, V ) where F is a multi-modal
Kripke frame for APMLHilb and V ⊆ W × P is a valuation. Given such a Kripke
structure, a satisfaction relation |= is deﬁned on W and formulae of APMLHilb in
the routine fashion. The clauses for the modalities are as follows:
• M, w |= A(m) iﬀ ∃v ∈ W, wR−1A v and M, v |= m
• M, w |= Am iﬀ ∀v ∈ W, wRAv implies M, v |= m
From the general Sahlqvist theorem of [10] for distributive modal logics and our
propositions 3.12 and 3.11 it follows that
Theorem 3.14 APMLTree is sound and complete with respect to Kripke structures
for APMLHilb.
3.4 Representation Theorem
We end this section by stating some results about a concrete construction for
DLAMs and a representation theorem for perfect DLAMs. They follow from our
previous results together with the general results of [10] about representation the-
orems for distributive modal logics; the deﬁnitions are from [10].
Deﬁnition 3.15 The complex or dual algebra of a multi-modal Kripke frame for
APMLHilb is the collection of the subsets of W that are downward closed with
respect to ≤.
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Deﬁnition 3.16 A distributive lattice is called perfect whenever it is complete,
completely distributive, and join generated by (i.e. each element of it is equal to
the join of) the set of all of its completely join irreducible elements.
Lemma 3.17 The complex algebra of a multi-modal Kripke frame for APMLHilb
is closed under intersection, union and the modal operators AZ := {w | ∀v ∈
W,wRv =⇒ v ∈ Z} and AZ = {w | ∃v ∈ W,wR−1v, v ∈ Z} for Z ⊆ W .
Proposition 3.18 The complex algebra of a multi-modal Kripke frame for
APMLHilb is a perfect DLAM.
Theorem 3.19 Given a perfect DLAM L, there is a frame whose complex algebra
is isomorphic to L.
Proof. By the above proposition 3.18, it suﬃces to construct a frame from L in a
way that the complex algebra of the frame is isomorphic to L. As shown in lemma
2.26 and proposition 2.25 of [10], the atom structure of a perfect DLAM is a such a
frame. 
4 Epistemic Applications
Following previous work [1,23,21], we interpret A(m) as ‘agent A’s uncertainty
about m’, that is, in eﬀect, the conjunction of all the propositions that A considers
as possible when in reality m holds. Accordingly, Am will be interpreted ‘agent A
has information that m’. We could use the terminology of belief, but wish to avoid
this as too suggestive about mental states. Agents can cheat and lie, so “knowledge”
is inappropriate.
The intended application of our calculus is scenarios where extra information is
available about the uncertainty of agents. This will always be of the form of one
or more assumptions of the form: ‘A(p) implies m′′’, where p is an atom and m′′
is a disjunction of atoms, e.g. p1 ∨ p2. Such assumptions express ideas that would,
in the relational semantics, be encoded in the accessibility relation, e.g. that such
and such a world can access certain other worlds. Such implications are not even
formulae of our language; we can however add them as follows, by adding (for each
such given assumption) the following evidently sound rule
Δ[(Γ, p)A,m′′]  m
Δ[(Γ, p)A]  m Assn
It is routine to note that the proofs of admissibility of Weakening (2.3) and of
Contraction (2.6) still work when these extra rules are considered; it is important
for example that the principal item of Assn be of the form (Γ, p)A rather than
A(p). The same applies to the invertibility lemmas.
Proposition 4.1 The Cut rule is admissible in APMLAssnTree .
Proof. There are three extra cases:
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(xii) The ﬁrst premiss is an instance of Assn:
Δ[(Γ, p)A,m′′]  m
Δ[(Γ, p)A]  m Assn Δ′[m]  m′
Δ′[Δ[(Γ, p)A]]  m′ Cut
is transformed to
Δ[(Γ, p)A,m′′]  m Δ′[m]  m′
Δ′[Δ[(Γ, p)A,m′′]]  m′ Cut
Δ′[Δ[(Γ, p)A]]  m′ Assn .
(xi)(m) The ﬁrst premiss is an instance of AR and the second premiss is an instance
of Assn, with the cut formula Am non-principal, i.e. not occurring as an
element in the principal item of Assn.
ΓA  m
Γ  Am AR
Δ[Am][(Γ′, p)B,m′′]  m′
Δ[Am][(Γ′, p)B]  m′ Assn
Δ[Γ][(Γ′, p)B]  m′ Cut
is transformed to
ΓA  m
Γ  Am AR Δ[Am][(Γ′, p)B,m′′]  m′
Δ[Γ][(Γ′, p)B,m′′]  m′ Cut
Δ[Γ][(Γ′, p)B]  m′ Assn
(xi)(n) The ﬁrst premiss is an instance of AR and the second premiss is an instance
of Assn, with the cut formula Am principal, i.e. occurring in the principal
item of Assn.
ΓA  m
Γ  Am AR
Δ[(Γ′,Am, p)B,m′′]  m′
Δ[(Γ′,Am, p)B]  m′ Assn
Δ[(Γ′,Γ, p)B]  m′ Cut
is transformed to
ΓA  m
Γ  Am AR Δ[(Γ′,Am, p)B,m′′]  m′
Δ[(Γ′,Γ, p)B,m′′]  m′ Cut
Δ[(Γ′,Γ, p)B]  m′ Assn

As an example consider the muddy children puzzle. It goes as follows: n children
are playing in the mud and k of them have muddy foreheads. Each child can see
the other children’s foreheads, but cannot see his own. Their father announces to
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them “At least one of you has a muddy forehead.” and then asks them “Do you
know it is you who has a muddy forehead?”. After k − 1 rounds of no answers by
all the children, the muddy ones know that they are muddy. After they announce
it in a round of yes answers, the clean children know that they are not muddy.
To formalize this scenario, assume the children are enumerated and the ﬁrst k
ones are muddy. Consider the propositional atoms sβ for β ⊆ {1, · · · , n} where sβ
stands for the proposition that exactly the children in β are muddy and s∅ stands
for ‘no child is muddy’. The formula i(sβ) stands for the uncertainty of child i
about each of these atoms before father’s announcement. Since child i can only see
the other children’s foreheads and not his own, he is uncertain about himself being
muddy or not. Let k = the set {1, . . . , k} (we write s1,··· ,k rather than s{1,··· ,k}), then
the assumption for the uncertainty of the muddy child i is ‘i(sk) implies sk ∨ sk\i’.
This is captured in the calculus by the following instance of the assumption rule
Δ[(Γ, sk)
i, sk ∨ sk\i]  m
Δ[(Γ, sk)
i]  m Assn
The assumption for the uncertainty of the clean child w is ‘w(sk) implies sk∨sk∪w’
and its Assn rule is similar. For 1 ≤ i, j ≤ k and k + 1 ≤ w we have that before
the k − 1’th announcement a muddy child i is uncertain about having a muddy
forehead: sk  i(sk ∨ sk\i) (i.e. i(sk)  sk ∨ sk\i). The proof tree of this property
is as follows
(sk)
i, sk ∨ sk\i  sk ∨ sk\i
Id
(sk)
i  sk ∨ sk\i
Assn
sk  i(sk ∨ sk\i)
iR
The uncertainties of children change after each announcement as follows 4 : the
k’s announcements eliminates the sγ disjunct from the uncertainty before the an-
nouncement when γ ⊆ {1, · · · , n} is of size k ; father’s announcement eliminates
the s∅ disjunct. For example, after the series of 1 to k− 1’th announcements all the
disjuncts except for sk will be eliminated from muddy child i’s uncertainty, hence
his previous uncertainty assumption rule changes to
Δ[(Γ, sk)
i, sk]  m
Δ[(Γ, sk)
i]  m Assn
The assumption for the uncertainty of the clean child w changes in a similar way. We
have that, after the k−1’th announcement, a muddy child i obtains information (a)
that he is muddy and (b) that other muddy children also obtain information that he
is muddy: sk  (isk)∧ (ijsk). However, a clean child w will be uncertain about
being muddy before and after the k − 1’th announcements: sk  w(sk ∨ sk∪w).
4 The way the uncertainties change after each announcement is formalized in the sequent calculus of previous
work [1,23] via adding a dynamic logic for actions and extra rules for epistemic update; that calculus was
not cut-free; Here, we change the assumptions of these uncertainties by hand and defer a full formalization
to future work, for more details see next section.
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The proof tree of the property for a muddy child i (where child j is also muddy) is
as follows:
(sk)
i, sk  sk
Id
(sk)
i  sk
Assn
sk  isk
iR
((sk)
i, sk)
j , sk  sk
Id
((sk)
i, sk)
j  sk
Assn
(sk)
i, sk  jsk
jR
(sk)
i  jsk
Assn
sk  ijsk
iR
sk  (isk) ∧ (ijsk)
∧R
Consider a twist to the above scenario. Suppose that none of the children are
muddy but that the father is a liar (or he cannot see properly) and the children do
not suspect this (thus their uncertainties change in the same way as above). After
father’s false announcement, any child i will (by reasoning) obtain false information
that he is the only muddy child: s∅  isi. The proof tree is as follows:
(s∅)i, si  si
Id
(s∅)i  si
Assn
s∅  isi iR
5 Conclusion and Future Work
We have developed a tree-style sequent calculus for a positive modal logic where
the modalities are adjoints rather than De Morgan duals. We have shown that the
structural rules of Weakening, Contraction and Cut are admissible in our calcu-
lus. We have also shown that our calculus is sound and complete with regard to
bounded distributive lattices with a pair of adjoint operators. Examples of these
are complete Heyting Algebras and residuated distributive lattice monoids. Using
general results of [10], we have shown that our calculus is sound and complete with
respect to ordered Kripke frames, through developing a Hilbert-style calculus that
has the same deductive power. We have motivated the applicability of our modal
logic by encoding in it partial assumptions of real-life scenarios and proving epis-
temic properties of agents in the milestone puzzle of muddy children, but also to a
newer mis-information version of it where father’s announcement is not necessarily
truthful. Since our box modality is not necessarily truthful, we can as well reason
about the settings where agents obtain false information as a result of dishonest
announcements. Our proof method of unfolding the adjunction and then renam-
ing the left adjoint to its assumed values has made our proofs considerably simpler
than the usual proof method of epistemic logics for the muddy children puzzle which
uses the ﬁxed point operator of the box. Our calculus has been implemented [15]
in Prolog; see this report for details of the (routine) decidability proof.
Our logic may be seen as a positive version of Kt, i.e. tense logic. Thus one can
deduce that a proof theory thereof can be obtained by restricting any proof theory
of tense logic to rules for conjunction and disjunction, the existential past and the
universal future that only satisfy the K axiom. We are unaware of a tree-style
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proof theory for this kind of modal logic in the literature, noting that the presence
of T, 4, 5 axioms make the proof theory far easier than their absence in the logic.
Thus we believe that our tree-style deep inference proof theory and its automated
decision procedure is novel and so is its application to epistemic scenarios.
Future directions of our work include:
• A tree-style cut-free sequent calculus that is sound and complete with regard to
a residuated monoid with adjoint modalities has been developed in [16], it can
easily be extended to a Quantale. We believe that pairing this calculus with
what we have in this paper, that is adding to it the rules for the action of the
Quantale on its right module such that it remains cut-free, will provide a cut-free
sequent calculus. From this one obtains a decision procedure for a distributed
version of Epistemic Systems of [1] and thus a negation-free version of Dynamic
Epistemic Logic of [2]. This calculus will be an improvement on the algebraic
decision procedure of [20], which only implements a sub-algebra of the algebra of
Epistemic Systems (namely one that allows A only on the right and A only on
the left hand side of the partial order).
• A representation theorem for perfect DLAMs follows from general results of [10].
But DLAMs need not be complete and completion involves introduction of, in
principle, inﬁnitary lattice operations. In [7] similar results are obtained for
positive modal logics where  and  come from the same relation; it might be
possible to alter their duality theorem and make it suitable for our adjoint modal
logic. However, those results, similar to that of [10], are with respect to the less
intuitive ordered frames. At the moment, we are more inclined towards working
with the usual non-ordered frames, along the lines of [9], that is by using theory
and counter-theory pairs to build our canonical frames.
• As shown in propositions 3.7 and 3.9, Heyting algebras and residuated distributive
lattice monoids are examples of DLAMs. So in principle our nested tree sequents
might be adapted to provide a new sound and complete cut-free proof system for
the logics based on these algebras, i.e. for intuitionistic and linear logics where
the conjunction and tensor (respectively) are treated as adjoint operators. In the
former case, we will need extra rules to take care of the commutativity of con-
junction, but in the latter case we hope to obtain a new cut-free proof theory for
non-commutative intuitionistic multiplicative linear logic. It is also worth inves-
tigating how logics with classical negation and thus de Morgan dual connectives
can be formulated in this context.
References
[1] Baltag, A., B. Coecke, and M. Sadrzadeh, Epistemic actions as resources, Journal of Logic and
Computation 17 (3) (2007), 555-585 arXiv:math/0608166.
[2] Baltag, A., and L.S. Moss, Logics for epistemic programs, Synthese 139 (2004), 165–224.
[3] Blackburn, P., M. de Rijke, and Y. Venema, “Modal Logic”, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press,
2001.
[4] Belnap, N., Display Logic, Journal of Philosophical Logic 11 (1982), 375–417.
M. Sadrzadeh, R. Dyckhoff / Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science 249 (2009) 451–470 469
[5] Bonette, N., and R. Gore´, A labelled sequent system for tense logic Kt, Australian Joint Conference on
Artiﬁcial Intelligence, Lecture Notes in Computer Science 1502 (1998), 71–82.
[6] Bru¨nnler, K., Deep Sequent Systems for Modal Logic, Advances in Modal Logic 6 (2006), 107–119.
[7] Celani, S., and R. Jansana, Priestley duality, a Sahlqvist theorem and a Goldblatt-Thomason theorem
for positive modal logic, Logic Journal of IGPL 7 (1999), 683–715.
[8] Davey, B.A., and H. A. Priestley, “Introduction to Lattices and Order”, Cambridge, Cambridge
University Press, 1990.
[9] Dunn, M., Positive modal logic, Studia Logica 55 (2005), 301–317.
[10] Gehrke, M., H. Nagahashi and Y. Venema, A Sahlqvist theorem for distributive modal logic, Annals of
Pure and Applied Logic 131 (2005), 65–102.
[11] Gore´, R., Substructural Logics on Display, Logic Journal of the IGPL, 6 (1998), 451–504.
[12] Huth, M. and M. Ryan, “Logic in Computer Science”, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2000.
[13] von Karger, B., Temporal Algebras, Mathematical Structures in Computer Science 8 (1998), 277–320.
[14] Kashima, R., Cut-Free Sequent Calculi for Some Tense Logics, Studia Logica 53, pp. 119-135, 1994.
[15] Kriener, J., M. Sadrzadeh and R. Dyckhoﬀ, Implementation of a cut-free sequent calculus for logics
with adjoint modalities, University of St Andrews, School of Computer Science Research Report, from
the third author, 2009.
[16] Moortgat, M., Multimodal linguistic inference, Bull. IGPL 3, (1995), 371–401.
[17] Negri, S., Proof analysis in modal logic, Journal of Philosophical Logic 34 (2005), 507–544.
[18] Ono, H., and Y. Komori, Logics without the contraction rule, Journal of Symbolic Logic 50 (1985),
169–201.
[19] Prior, A., “Time and Tense”, Oxford University Press, 1968.
[20] Richards, S., and M. Sadrzadeh, Aximo: Automated Axiomatic Reasoning for Information Update,
Proceedings of the 5th workshop on Methods for Modalities, to appear in Electronic Notes in Theoretical
Computer Science.
[21] Sadrzadeh, M., Ockham’s Razor and Reasoning about Information Flow , Synthese, October 2008, DOI:
10.1007/s11229-008-9414-7.
[22] Sadrzadeh, M., and R. Dyckhoﬀ, Positive Logic with Adjoint Modalities: Proof Theory, Semantics and
Reasoning about Information [full version] , arXiv:0903.2448.
[23] Sadrzadeh, M., “Actions and Resources in Epistemic Logic”, PhD Thesis, Universite´ du Que´bec a`
Montre´al, 2006. http://eprints.ecs.soton.ac.uk/12823/01/all.pdf.
[24] Simpson, A., “The Proof Theory and Semantics of Intuitionistic Modal Logic”, PhD Thesis, University
of Edinburgh, 1993.
[25] Troelstra, A. and H. Schwichtenberg, “Basic Proof Theory”, CUP 2001.
M. Sadrzadeh, R. Dyckhoff / Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science 249 (2009) 451–470470
